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1 WHY THE DEBATE IS NOT MERELY TERMINOLOGICAL
The very best examples of scientiﬁc induction were known in the time of William
Whewell (1994–1866) and John Stuart Mill (1806–1873). It is puzzling, there-
fore, that there was such a deep disagreement between them about the nature of
induction. It is perhaps astounding that the dispute is unresolved to this very day!
What disagreement could there be about Newton’s discovery of universal grav-
itation? Prior to Newton, it was well known that gravity acts on objects near the
Earth’s surface, and Copernicus even speculated that the planets have a spherical
shape because they have their own gravity. But Newton was the ﬁrst to understand
that it’s the Earth’s gravity that keeps the Moon in orbit around the Earth, and
that the Sun’s gravity keeps the Earth and the Moon in orbit around the Sun. At
the root of this discovery was Newton’s explication of the kinematical concept of
acceleration. To understand that the Moon (just like the fabled apple) is pulled by
the Earth, one has to understand that the Moon is accelerating towards the Earth
even if it is moving uniformly on the circular orbit around the Earth. Acceleration
must not be deﬁned as the time rate of change of speed, but as the time rate of
change of velocity, where velocity has direction as well as magnitude. Thus, the
Moon is accelerating towards the Earth because its velocity is changing its direc-
tion. Galileo, on the other hand, worked with a circular law of inertia, according
to which uniform circular motion around the Earth was a “natural” motion that
required no force.
Further explication of the new conception of acceleration led Newton to discover
that if the line from a point O to a body B sweeps out equal areas (Kepler’s second
law), then B is accelerating towards O. If, in addition, the body follows an elliptical
path with O at one focus (Kepler’s ﬁrst law), then the acceleration towards O is
inversely proportional to the square of the distance of B from O. In the case of the
planets moving around the sun, if we assume that the constant of proportionality
is the mass of the sun, then Kepler’s third law follows as well. Thus, Newton’s new
conception of acceleration causes Kepler’s three laws to “jump together” in a way
that tests the conceptions that Kepler had previously employed, involving ellipses,
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areas swept out by the line OB, the mean length of that line, and its period of
revolution around the sun.
For Whewell, the addition of the conceptions in each of these inductions is
the deﬁning characteristic of induction. Whewell introduced a new term for the
process of binding the ‘facts’ by a new conception. He called it the colligation of
facts, and used this phrase interchangeably with the word ‘induction’. Mill reacted
negatively to this ‘improper’ use of the term. Mill agreed that new conceptions
are often applied to the ‘facts’ during an induction, but he insisted that they are
not part of the induction, and certainly not a deﬁning characteristic. For Mill,
induction consisted in extrapolating or interpolating a regularity from the known
instances to the unknown instances, as is classically the case in examples of simple
enumerative induction such as: All observed swans are white; therefore all swans
are white. Whewell agreed that interpolation and extrapolation does, in general,
result from a colligation of facts, but should not be the property that deﬁnes
induction.
It is tempting at this point to dismiss the debate as merely terminological.
Whewell has an unusual conception of what induction is, but once it is taken on
board, it is possible to translate between the two vocabularies. I agree that there
is a large terminological component in the debate, but I insist that it is not merely
terminological. Behind the diﬀerence in terminology is a very deep disagreement
about the objectivity of human knowledge. Mill and Whewell both want to defend
the objectivity of human knowledge. But they have quite distinctive views on how
it comes about, and Whewell’s idea is interesting and new.
Mill is entrenched in the rather extreme empiricist view that human knowledge
is objective because it is built on an objective foundation of empirically given
statements from which higher claims are inferred using the objective canons of
inductive reasoning. Human knowledge maintains its objectivity (to the extent
that it succeeds) by minimizing the inﬂuences of subjective elements at every
stage of the process.
For Whewell, subjective and objective elements are inseparable parts of human
knowledge at any level in the hierarchy of knowledge, from the concept-ladenness of
perceptual knowledge at the bottom, to the concept-ladenness of the highest forms
of scientiﬁc knowledge at the top. The counter-proposal is that empirical success at
the higher levels of knowledge, captured in terms of what he called the consilience
of inductions, can help to secure the lower levels as a kind of bootstrapping eﬀect.
For example, Kepler’s colligations of facts are concept-laden in a way that makes
them subjective at ﬁrst, but once Newton used the new conception of force and
acceleration to show how the facts, described in terms of Kepler’s colligations,
lead successfully to a higher level colligation of facts, then the subjective elements
involved are successfully “objectiﬁed”. Knowledge is like a building in which the
addition of higher ﬂoors helps strengthen the lower levels.
Whewell harbored a deep distain for Mill’s purely empiricist philosophy, which
he saw as constantly downplaying the importance of the subjective component of
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In contrast, the conceptual components of knowledge are, for Whewell, the very
instruments that ultimately explain how human knowledge is possible. They pro-
duce the colligations that may be conﬁrmed by the consiliences of colligations,
which serves to objectify the subject elements, making knowledge possible. The
introduction of new conceptions in the colligation of facts is therefore a deﬁning
characteristic of induction.
There is a major problem in trying to understand the Whewell-Mill debate from
what the authors wrote. Whewell was primarily a historian of science, but Mill
did not have a good knowledge of the history of science. Whewell allowed Mill to
center the debate on particular examples of induction such as Kepler’s inference
that Mars moves on an ellipse. They got so tied up in that example, that the larger
philosophical diﬀerences got lost in the discussion. It’s possible that Whewell’s
hierarchical view of knowledge led him to believe that the bigger picture is played
out in smaller examples on a smaller scale. Unfortunately, Whewell did not recall
the details of the Kepler example in suﬃcient detail bring out those features of it.
In section 2, I attempt to remedy that problem by describing the Kepler example
in a way that challenges Mill’s picture of it. Section 3 turns to Whewell’s bigger
picture by discussing his tests of hypotheses, while section 4 argues that Whewell-
Mill debate helps us understand why sophisticated methods of induction have not
been programmed to run automatically on a computer. Finally, section 5 asks
whether the Whewell-Mill debate may help us identify fundamental limitations in
the scope of Bayesian and Likelihoodist theories of evidence and conﬁrmation.
2 THE KEPLER EXAMPLE AND THE COLLIGATION OF FACTS
The colligation of facts was Whewell’s name for scientiﬁc induction. Its deﬁning
characteristic is the introduction of a new conception not previously applied to
the data at hand, which unites and connects the data. In curve ﬁtting, the idea is
easy to visualize. According to Whewell, “the Colligation of ascertained Facts into
general Propositions” consists of (1) the Selection of the Idea, (2) the Construction
of the Conception, and (3) the Determination of the Magnitudes. In curve ﬁtting,
these three steps correspond to (1) the determination of the Independent Variable,
(2) the Formula, and (3) the Coeﬃcients. Once the variables are chosen (Step
1), one chooses a particular functional relationship (Step 2; choose the Formula,
Conception, family of curves) characterized in terms of some adjustable parameters
(which Whewell calls coeﬃcients), and then one ﬁts the curves to the data in order
to estimate the values of the parameters (Step 3; determining the magnitude of
the coeﬃcients).
Consider the simplest possible example. Suppose we hang an object on a beam
balance in order to infer its mass from the distance at which a unit mass must
be slid along the beam to counterbalance the object in question. If the units are
chosen appropriately, and the device is built well, then the mass value can be
read straight from the distance at which the unit weight balances the beam. The
dependent variable chosen in step 1 of the colligation of facts is x (there is no96 Malcolm Forster
independent variable), and the family of “curves” or the formula chosen in step
2 is x = m, where x is the distance of the unit mass from the fulcrum and m
is an adjustable parameter, which represents the mass of the object in question.
Whewell’s third step in the colligation of facts refers to the determination of the
mass values by inferring them from the x values using the formula. The conception
being introduced is the formula (∀o)(x(o) = m(o)), where ‘o’ ranges over a set of
objects. The formula is something added to or imposed upon the facts by mind
of the investigator; it is not contained in, or read from, those facts. Of course,
the magnitude of the mass is read from the facts; indeed, this is the third step in
Whewell’s colligation of facts. But that does not mean that the formula itself is
determined by the facts.
The underdetermination implies that the subjective elements in the colligation
of facts make the inductive conclusions uncertain and conjectural. In order to
defend the objectivity of our knowledge, we have two choices. We can choose the
Millean strategy of denying that there is ever any such underdetermination, or go
for the Whewellian strategy of allowing that the consilience of inductions can later
test the conjecture, and upgrade its conﬁrmational status in light of this higher-
level empirical success. To take our hindsight wisdom for granted, as Mill does,
and to suppose that the initial induction had this status all along, is to commit
the kind of error that non-historians often make.
Though our beam balance example is not a real piece of history, the Millean
mistake in that example would be to take the agreement of spring balance mea-
surements of mass and beam balance measurements of mass for granted, and to
assume that the justiﬁcation for postulating ‘mass’ already existed prior to the
consilience.
Unfortunately, the debate centers around the Kepler example and neither author
gives the details of this important example in suﬃcient detail for the purpose at
hand. It is especially confusing because Mill held the very strange and rather
complicated view that Kepler did not perform any induction at all, even in the
very broad sense in which Mill uses the term.
Mill’s strategy is to make a distinction between a description and an explanation,
and to argue that the inductive conclusion in the Kepler example is merely a
description of the data, and therefore, there was no induction performed by Kepler.
For example, in his view, when the ancients hypothesized that the planets move by
being embedded on crystalline spheres, they put forward an explanation of celestial
motions. But when Ptolemy and Copernicus conceived of the motions in terms
of the combinations of circles, they were merely putting forward a description. In
Mill’s words:
When the Greeks abandoned the supposition that the planetary mo-
tions were produced by the revolution of material wheels, and fell back
upon the idea of “mere geometrical spheres or circles,” there was more
in this change of opinion than the mere substitution of an ideal curve
for a physical one. There was the abandonment of a theory, and the
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ing the doctrine of material wheels a mere description. That doctrine
was an attempt to point out the force by which the planets were acted
upon, and compelled to move in their orbits. But when, by a great
step in philosophy, the materiality of the wheels was discarded, and
the geometrical forms alone retained, the attempt to account for the
motions was given up, and what was left of the theory was a mere
description of the orbits. [Mill 1872, Book III, Chapter ii, section 4]
It’s true that no one would think of calling the doctrine of material wheels a
mere description. But it is very strange that Mill should insist that it becomes a
mere description as soon as the materiality of the wheels is discarded. For these
“mere descriptions” entail predictions that are not part of the data, and anything
that goes beyond the data goes from the known to the unknown should therefore
count as an induction, according to Mill’s own deﬁnition. Thus, even if Kepler’s
conclusion were a mere description, in the sense that Mill has just described, it
should not disqualify Kepler’s inference as counting as an induction.
In order to be as charitable as possible to Mill, let me begin with the example
that he presents as the clearest in his favor. It is about the circumnavigation of
an island:
A navigator sailing in the midst of the ocean discovers land: he cannot
at ﬁrst, or by any one observation, determine whether it is a continent
or an island; but he coasts along it, and after a few days ﬁnds himself
to have sailed completely round it: he then pronounces it an island.
Now there was no particular time or place of observation at which he
could perceive that this land was entirely surrounded by water: he
ascertained the fact by a succession of partial observations, and then
selected a general expression which summed up in two or three words
the whole of what he so observed. But is there anything of the nature
of an induction in this process? Did he infer anything that had not
been observed, from something else which had? Certainly not. He had
observed the whole of what the proposition asserts. That the land in
question is an island, is not an inference from the partial facts which
the navigator saw in the course of his circumnavigation; it is the facts
themselves; it is a summary of those facts; the description of a complex
fact, to which those simpler ones are as the parts of a whole. [Mill,
1872, Book III, ch. ii, section 3]
Astonishingly, even in this example, Mill’s case is very weak. For if we think
carefully about what is observed in this example, it is the similarity of the view
of the shoreline at the start and the end of the circumnavigation. The views are
not exactly the same because the distance from the shore is diﬀerent, the tides
are diﬀerent, and the times of day are diﬀerent. It is not given in the facts that
the views are of the same shoreline. That is a conclusion. The hypothesis that
an island has been circumnavigated explains why the views look similar. That
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which may be false. For it predicts that if we continue sailing further in the same
direction, then we will see an ordered sequence of previously seen views of the
shoreline. It is puzzling that Mill does not see this; he clearly deﬁnes induction, in
his terms, as any inference from the known to the unknown. Perhaps he sees the
logical gap as small in this case. But it gets much larger in the Kepler example
because it is not merely a circumnavigation that is inferred, but also the exact
path (Kepler’s ﬁrst law) and rate of motion (Kepler’s area law). The puzzle is
resolved a little once we look more carefully at Mill’s description of the Kepler
example. He continues from the previous passage.
Now there is, I conceive, no diﬀerence in kind between this simple
operation [in the island example], and that by which Kepler ascertained
the nature of the planetary orbits: and Kepler’s operation, all at least
that was characteristic in it, was not more an inductive act than that
of our supposed navigator.
The object of Kepler was to determine the real path described by each
of the planets, or let us say the planet Mars (since it was of that body
that he ﬁrst established the two of his three laws which did not require
a comparison of planets). To do this there was no other mode than
that of direct observation: and all which observation could do was
to ascertain a great number of the successive places of the planet; or
rather, of its apparent places. That the planet occupied successively
all these positions, or at all events, positions which produced the same
impressions on the eye, and that it passed from one of these to another
insensibly, and without any apparent breach of continuity; thus much
the senses, with the aid of the proper instruments, could ascertain.
What Kepler did more than this, was to ﬁnd what sort of a curve
these points would make, supposing them to be all joined together.
He expressed the whole series of the observed places of Mars by what
Dr. Whewell calls the general conception of an ellipse. This operation
was far from being as easy as that of the navigator who expressed the
series of his observations on successive points of the coast by the general
conception of an island. But it is the very same sort of operation; and
if the one is not an induction but a description, this must also be true
of the other. [Mill, 1872, Book III, ch. ii, section 3]
Mill’s ﬁrst naivet´ e is his passing from “the successive apparent places of the planet”
to “the successive places of the planet”, as if there is no important gap between
the 3-dimensional positions of Mars and the angular position of Mars relative to
the ﬁxed stars. Then, without any additional argument, Mill simply aﬃrms the
analogy: “...if the one is not an induction but a description, this must also be
true of the other.” Let’s read more.
The only real induction concerned in the case, consisted in inferring
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by points in an imaginary ellipse, therefore Mars would continue to re-
volve in that same ellipse; and in concluding (before the gap had been
ﬁlled up by further observations) that the positions of the planet dur-
ing the time which intervened between two observations, must have
coincided with the intermediate points of the curve. For these were
facts which had not been directly observed. They were inferences from
the observations; facts inferred, as distinguished from facts seen. But
these inferences were so far from being a part of Kepler’s philosophical
operation, that they had been drawn long before he was born. As-
tronomers had long known that the planets periodically returned to
the same places. [Mill, 1872, Book III, ch. ii, section 3]
So, ﬁnally, Mill states why Kepler did not perform an induction. The induction
was already performed by astronomers before him who had concluded that the
planets returned to the same places after a ﬁxed period of time. Yes, astronomers
before Kepler did assume that planets repeated exactly the same paths. But
that inductive conclusion is very vague because it does not say what the path
was. Specifying the path adds a great deal of predictive content, and so Kepler’s
inference does take us from what is known to what is unknown even if we treat
the periodicity of the orbits as known.
The only way out for Mill is to insist that the full speciﬁcation of the path
(the particular ellipse) was a part of the data. Mill seems to be assuming that
continuous sections of Mars’s orbit were observed at various time, and over time,
these sections covered the whole ellipse. This is factually incorrect, as we shall see.
But even if it were true, it still does not follow that Kepler conclusion is a mere
description of the data, unless the observations are exact. Any margin of error can
allow for a multitude of possible paths that can disagree in the accelerations that
are attributed to the planets at diﬀerent times. The consequences that Kepler’s
laws have concerning the (unobserved) instantaneous accelerations of the planets
will be crucial in Newton’s higher level colligation of Kepler’s three laws, according
to which all the planets are attracted to the sun inversely to the square of their
distances to the sun.
It’s time to correct this series of mistakes (see also [Harper, 1989; 1993; 2002;
Harper et al., 1994]).1
Mill’s ﬁrst mistake was to ignore the diﬀerence between angular positions and
3-dimensional positions; this is a huge mistake. The correct story is complicated
because it’s not so easy to ﬁll this logical gap. To do it, Kepler ﬁrst needed to
determine earth’s orbit around the sun in relation to a particular point on the
orbit of Mars. The measured period of the Martian orbit was 687 days, which
is a little under two years. Tycho Brahe’s observations from earth at E, and at
E1 687 days later, Kepler obtained the angle SE1M directly, and obtained ESE1
from well known tabulations of the (angular) motion of the sun across the ﬁxed
stars. (See Fig. 1.) Mill is right that Kepler simply assumed that the orbits were
1I follow Hanson’s [1970, pp. 277–282] account.100 Malcolm Forster
periodic, even though it could never have been justiﬁed as exactly true (because
it is not).
Figure 1. The ﬁrst step in Kepler’s determination of Mars orbit was the calculation
of the earth’s orbital motion. S denotes the sun, and M refers to Mars.
As a check, Kepler might also have compared the two apparent positions of Mars
relative to the ﬁxed stars to obtain the third angle in the triangle, SME1 (given
that Mars returns to the same position M after 687 days). This is an important
check given that the periodicity assumption is not entirely secure.
The shape of the triangle SE1M is thereby given, and this determines the
distance SE1 as a ratio of the (unknown) distance SM. Similar calculations for
triangles SE2M, etc, obtained when Mars had returned to the point M again,
then give the distances SE2, etc, as a ratio of SM also. By then ﬁtting a smooth
elliptic orbit to these discrete data points, Kepler determined the motion of the
Earth around the sun.
Only now is Kepler able to return to the main problem of measuring the distance
of Mars from the sun at diﬀerent stages of its orbit. Consider another observation
of Mars at M0 in opposition with the earth at E0
0 687 days later at E0
1. (See Fig. 2.)
Again, the shape of the triangle SE0
1M0 is determined from the knowledge of its
angles, and this gives the distance SM0 as a ratio of SE0
1. But the distances SE10
are known (as a ratio of SM) from the previous colligation of the facts concerning
the orbit of earth. Therefore, SM0, SM00, etc, are determined as ratios of SM.
Kepler then ﬁtted another elliptic curve to obtain the orbit of Mars around the sun
as a continuous function of time, which he described in his ﬁrst law (elliptic path)
and second law (equal areas swept out in equal times). Here Kepler is adding a
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these inductions are suggestive, and he may have eliminated many competing
hypotheses, Kepler himself did not succeed in fully justifying his results. That
was left to Newton.
Figure 2. The second step in Kepler’s calculation of the Martian orbit.
Against Mill, it is now clear that Kepler’s data was only a discrete sampling
of points on Mars’ orbit. Moreover, each was inferred from measurements of the
angles of a triangle and distance ratios that were inferred from another colliga-
tion of facts. They were hardly the incorrigible “givens” that empiricists like Mill
assume to be the bedrock of inductive inferences. The 3-dimensional positions at-
tributed to Mars were determined in a heavily theory-laden way. However natural
it might seem to assume, in hindsight, that the planets live in a 3-dimensional
space, such attributions are not part of any theory-neutral observation language
[Kuhn, 1970]. But, for Whewell, this does not signal the end of the objectivity of
science. Higher-level consiliences discovered by Newton will eventually ground the
validity of these lower-level conceptions.
The same point applies to Kepler’s ellipse. Yes, the ellipse hypothesis might
have produced the best ﬁt with the data out of the nineteen hypotheses that
Kepler tried, but that does not mean that was completely secure at that time.
It was later conﬁrmed by the intimate connection between the inverse square law
and Kepler’s ﬁrst and second laws discovered by Newton when he proved that
any planet moving such that the line from sun sweeps out equal areas in equal
time is accelerating towards the sun, and further, that if the path is an ellipse,
the sun-seeking acceleration is inversely proportional to the square of the distance.
Furthermore, Kepler’s third law is icing on the cake because it also follows from102 Malcolm Forster
the inverse square law that the ratios R3/T2 are independent measurements of the
Sun’s mass, adding to the consilience of inductions.
Colligation, for Mill, is a part of the invention process, whereas induction (prop-
erly so-called) is relevant to questions of justiﬁcation. Whewell’s characterization
of induction, Mill objects, belongs to (what we call) the ‘context of discovery’.
Accordingly, Mill [1872, Book III, ch. ii, section 5] charges that “Dr Whewell calls
nothing induction where there is not a new mental conception introduced and ev-
erything induction where there is.” “But,” he continues, “this is to confuse two
very diﬀerent things, Invention and Proof.” “The introduction of a new conception
belongs to Invention: and invention may be required in any operation, but it is
the essence of none.” Abstracting a general proposition from known facts without
concluding anything about unknown instances, Mill goes on to say, is merely a
“colligation of facts” and bears no resemblance to induction at all.
In sum, Mill thinks that the colligation of facts are mere descriptions that have
nothing to do with the justiﬁcation of scientiﬁc hypotheses.
Contrary to what Mill thinks, colligations are not mere descriptions. They do
add something unknown to the facts; any general proposition (in Whewell’s sense)
can be tested further, either by untried instances, or by the consilience of induc-
tions. It does, therefore, go beyond the data. Yes, mental acts are essential to
invention and discovery. But they are also essential to justiﬁcation. Conceptions
are essential to the justiﬁcation of the hypothesis that results from a colligation
of facts in spite of the fact that conceptions are mental, and therefore subjective.
Conceptions are essential because there can be no consilience of inductions with-
out them. For, the consilience of inductions often consists of the agreement of
magnitudes (Step 3 in the colligation of facts) determined in separate inductions,
which derive from the new conception imposed upon the facts in those inductions.
Mill has no good reason to accuse Whewell of confusing invention and proof. At its
core, the dispute is really about the nature of evidence and justiﬁcation — about
how hypotheses are tested and conﬁrmed.
3 WHEWELL’S TESTS OF HYPOTHESES
Whewell distinguishes four tests of scientiﬁc hypotheses (although the last one is
more like a sign than a test). By ‘instances’ he is referring to empirical data that
can be ﬁtted to the hypothesis in question:
1. The Prediction of Tried Instances.
2. The Prediction of Untried Instances;
3. The Consilience of Inductions; and
4. The Convergence of a Theory towards Simplicity and Unity.
Keep in mind that Whewell uses the term ‘colligation of facts’ interchangeably with
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facts are successfully uniﬁed in some way. Newton’s theory of gravity applied the
same form of equation to celestial and terrestrial motions (the inverse square law),
and in the case of the moon and the apple, both colligations of facts made use
of the same adjustable parameter (the earth’s mass). Consequently, the moon’s
motion and an apple’s motion provided independent measurements of the earth’s
mass, and the agreement of these independent measurements was an important
test of Newton’s hypothesis. This test is more than a prediction of tried or untried
instances. It leads to a prediction of facts of a diﬀerent kind (facts about celestial
bodies from facts about terrestrial bodies, and vice versa).
The consilience of inductions leads to a convergence towards simplicity and
unity because uniﬁed theories forge connections between disparate phenomena,
and these connections may be tested empirically, usually by the agreement of
independent measurements. So, a theory can be uniﬁed in response to a successful
consilience of inductions. Simplicity and unity are necessary conditions for the
consilience of inductions, but not suﬃcient. A theory like ‘everything is the same
as everything else’ is highly uniﬁed, but not consilient. As Einstein once described
it, science should be simple, but not too simple.
In the Novum Organon Renovatum, Whewell [1989, 151] speaks of the con-
silience of inductions in the following terms:
We have here spoken of the prediction of facts of the same kind as those
from which our rule was collected [tests (1) and (2)]. But the evidence
in favour of our induction is of a much higher and more forcible charac-
ter when it enables us to explain and determine cases of a kind diﬀerent
from those which were contemplated in the formation of our hypothe-
sis. The instances in which this has occurred, indeed, impress us with
a conviction that the truth of our hypothesis is certain. No accident
could give rise to such an extraordinary coincidence. No false suppo-
sition could, after being adjusted to one class of phenomena, exactly
represent a diﬀerent class, where the agreement was unforeseen and
uncontemplated. That rules springing from remote and unconnected
quarters should thus leap to the same point, can only arise from that
being the point where truth resides.
Accordingly the cases in which inductions from classes of facts alto-
gether diﬀerent have thus jumped together, belong only to the best
established theories which the history of science contains. And as I
shall have occasion to refer to this peculiar feature of their evidence,
I will take the liberty of describing it by a particular phrase; and will
term it the Consilience of Inductions. [Whewell, 1989, 153]
“Real discoveries are . . . mixed with baseless assumptions” (Whewell, 1989, 145),
which is why Whewell considers the consilience of inductions to provide additional
guidance in ﬁnding the “point where the truth resides.”
Whewell has been soundly criticized over the years for his claim that the con-
silience of inductions “impress us with a conviction that the truth of our hypothesis104 Malcolm Forster
is certain” and that “no false supposition could, after being adjusted to one class
of phenomena, exactly represent a diﬀerent class, where the agreement was un-
foreseen and uncontemplated.” Given the explication of the notion of truth that
we use today, according to which a hypothesis is false if any small part of it is
false, Whewell’s claims cannot be defended. But if they are suitably qualiﬁed,
they cannot be so easily dismissed. It is true that such cases “belong only to the
best established theories which the history of science contains.”
In place of the consilience of inductions, Mill talks about the deductive sub-
sumption of lower level empirical laws under more fundamental laws, which is a
well-known part of hypothetico-deductivism. Whewell’s account of consilience gets
around the common objection that deductive subsumption is too easy to satisfy.
For instance, hypothetico-deductivism tries to maintain that Galileo’s theory of
terrestrial motion, call it G, and Kepler’s theory of celestial motion, K, are sub-
sumed under Newton’s theory N because N deductively entails G and K. The
problem is that G and K are also subsumed under the mere conjunction of (G&K),
so deductive subsumption by itself cannot fully capture the advantage that N is
more uniﬁed or consilient. Many respond to the problem by saying that uniﬁcation
and simplicity must be added to conﬁrmational equation as non-empirical virtues.
But this is to short-change empiricism, because N does make empirical predic-
tions that (G&K) does not. Namely, N predicts the agreement of independent
measurements of the earth’s mass from celestial and terrestrial phenomena. That
is why Whewell’s theory is better than Mill’s theory.
Many of these ideas about conﬁrmation have been raised in the literature be-
fore [Forster, 1988]. Earman [1978] uses the idea that uniﬁed hypotheses have
greater empirical content to make sense of Ramsey’s argument for realism. Fried-
man [1981; 1983] uses a similar idea to makes sense of arguments for the reality of
spacetime. Glymour [1980] discusses ideas about theory and evidence that have a
distinctly Whewellian ﬂavor. Norton [2000a; 2000b] emphasizes the overdetermi-
nation of parameters, Harper and Myrvold [2002], Harper [2002; 2007] emphasize
the importance of the agreements of independent measurements, and provide ex-
cellent detailed examples. These authors appreciate the nuances involved in real
examples of scientiﬁc discovery, yet there is still a failure to see two things very
clearly: (1) The depth of diﬃculties for standard theories of conﬁrmation, such as
Bayesianism, and (therefore) a failure to appreciate (2) the relevance of Whewell’s
ideas to contemporary debates about theory and evidence. To defend the objectiv-
ity of knowledge, we need to understand how conceptions introduced in our best
explanations are “objectiﬁed” by the agreement of independent measurements in
a hierarchy of successive generalizations. None of this is going to “fall out” of
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4 DISPUTES ABOUT INDUCTION THAT HAVE IGNORED THESE
LESSONS
Hempel [1945] made an important distinction between the direct and indirect con-
ﬁrmation of hypotheses. Direct conﬁrmation is the familiar process by which a
generalization is conﬁrmed by observed instances of it, while indirect conﬁrmation
arises from its place in a larger network of hypotheses. For example, the law of free
fall on the moon is directly conﬁrmed by the experiments done on the moon by the
Apollo astronauts, but was indirectly conﬁrmed long before that by being deduced
from Newton’s theory of gravitation, which has its own support. Whewell’s discus-
sion of what he termed successive generalizations and the consilience of inductions
can be seen as an account of indirect conﬁrmation.
Whewell’s idea is this: The aim of any inductive inference is to extract informa-
tion from the data that can then be used in higher level inductions. For example,
Copernicus’s theory can be used to infer 3-dimensional positions of the planets
relative to the sun from 2-dimensional positions relative to the ﬁxed stars. The
3-dimensional positions were then used by Newton to provide instances of the in-
verse square law of gravitation, which enable us to make predictions about one
planet based on observations of other planets. It was only this higher-level empir-
ical success that ﬁnally conﬁrmed Copernicus’s conjecture that the earth moved
with the sun at the center. Only then can we fully trust the inferences about
3-dimensional positions inferred from Copernicus’s theory on which Newton’s in-
ductions we based. Whewell explains why this circle is not vicious.
Mill’s mistake is to reduce Whewell’s innovative idea of the consilience of in-
ductions solely as the deductive subsumption of lower-level generalizations under
higher-level laws. The problem with Mill’s idea is that it seems to involve a kind
of circular reasoning: A is conﬁrmed because A entails B and B is conﬁrmed; but
wait, B is now better conﬁrmed because A is conﬁrmed and A entails B. Mill fails
to notice that higher-level generalizations have a direct kind of empirical conﬁr-
mation in terms of the agreement of independent measurements of theoretically
postulated quantities. In the case of Newton’s theory of planetary motions, it
was the agreement of independent measurements of the earth’s mass obtained by
observing the moon’s motion and terrestrial projectiles, and the agreement of in-
dependent measurements of the sun’s mass, and of Jupiter’s mass, and so on. The
consilience of inductions thereby relies on aspects of the data that play no role in
the conﬁrmation of lower-level generalizations. This is why indirect conﬁrmation,
on the Whewellian view, avoids the Millian circle.
Whewell’s writings were responsible, in part, for the existence of Book III On
Induction in Mill’s System of Logic, in which many footnotes and sections are
devoted to the important task of separating Mill’s views from Whewell’s. In 1849,
Whewell published a reply called “Of Induction, with Especial reference to Mr.
Mill’s System of Logic”. Near the beginning of his commentary, Whewell [1989,
p. 267] main complaint is that Mill “has extended the use of the term Induction
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instances; but to cases in which the particular instance is dealt with by means of
experience in the rude sense in which experience is asserted of brutes; and in which,
of course, we can in no way imagine that the law is possessed or understood as a
general proposition. Mill has thus “overlooked the broad and essential diﬀerence
between speculative knowledge and practical action; and has introduced cases
which are quire foreign to the idea of science, alongside with cases from which
we may hope to obtain some views of the nature of science and the processes by
which it must be formed.” In a footnote to chapter i, Book III, Mill [1872] replies:
“I disclaim, as strongly as Dr. Whewell can do, the application of such terms
as induction, inference, or reasoning, to operations performed by mere instinct,
that is from an animal impulse, without the exertion of any intelligence.” But the
essence of Whewell’s complaint is that simple enumerative induction, and Mill’s
other methods of induction, are no more complicated than animal impulses even
when it is consciously employed; at least, not diﬀerent in a way that accounts for
the diﬀerence in intelligence.
If the complaint is about the established use of the word “induction”, then I
tend to think that Whewell is the one swimming against the tide. But it would
be a mistake to think that this is merely a linguistic debate about the use of
the word ‘induction’; for as Whewell notes, there is always a proposition that
accompanies every deﬁnition, and the proposition in this case is something like:
Simple enumerative induction (such as inferring that all humans are mortal from
John, Paul,...are mortal) adequately represents the habit of mind that brings
about the highest forms of human knowledge. This is an assumption that should
be questioned in light of what we know today.
Whewell expands upon his worries by characterizing most generalizations of
the form “All humans are mortal” as a mere juxtapositions of particular cases
[Whewell, 1989, 163]. Whewell agrees that induction is the operation of discov-
ering and proving general propositions, but he appears to have a diﬀerent un-
derstanding of the term “general”. For Whewell (1989, 47) it is necessary that
“In each inductive process, there is some general idea introduced, which is given,
not by the phenomena, but by the mind.” The inductive conclusion is, therefore,
composed of facts and conceptions “bound together so as to give rise to those
general propositions of which science consists”. “All humans are mortal” is not
general in the appropriate sense because there has been no conception added to
the fact that John, Paul,... are mortal.2 Whewell insists that in every genuine
induction, “The facts are known but they are insulated and unconnected . . . The
pearls are there but they will not hang together until some one provides the string”
[Whewell, 1989, 140-141]. The “pearls” are the data points and the “string” is a
new conception that connects and uniﬁes the data. The “pearls” in “All As are
Bs” are unstrung because “All As are Bs”, though general in the sense that it is
2But it would be incorrect to say that Whewell thinks that no generalization of the for All
As are Bs can introduce a new conception. For example, it could be that “All metals conduct
electricity” qualiﬁes as an induction conclusion because the term ‘metal’ may represent a new
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universally quantiﬁed, does not connect or unify the facts; it does not colligate the
facts. For Whewell, this process of uniting the facts under a general conception,
which he calls the colligation of facts, is an essential step in the formation of human
knowledge. Mill would gladly transfer Whewell’s description of the colligation of
facts to his own pages, but fails to see that it has the kind of importance that
Whewell attaches to it.
There are two worries that everyone should have about simple enumerative
induction:
(1) It is not a habit of mind that we have in a great many cases; in fact, it
is the subject of well known philosophical jokes. A philosopher jumps from the
Empire State Building and is heard to say as he falls past the 99th ﬂoor “99 ﬂoors
and I’m not dead!” As a diﬀerent example, imagine a study of radioactive decay
in which all the samples observed are radioactive, yet the very law of radioactive
decay discovered from these observations leads us to deny that any ﬁnite sample
will be radioactive for all times.
(2) When such a habit of mind is desirable, it is very easy to implement. Simple
associative learning is not what marks the diﬀerence between human intelligence
and animal intelligence. I say ‘salt’ and you think ‘pepper’. Pavlov’s dogs are the
most famous case of a kind of associative learning in animals known as classical
conditioning. In more recent times, the same learning ability has been demon-
strated in animals as primitive as sea slugs (Aplysia californica). It’s not just that
“brutes” do it, sea slugs do it! A strong 1-sec electric shock to the mantle of the
slug (called the unconditioned stimulus UCS) elicits a prolonged withdrawal of its
siphon. The UCS in Pavlov’s dogs is the smell of meat, which elicits salivation.
The aim of the experiments is to demonstrate an ability to learn to predict the
UCS from a conditioned stimulus (CS). In Pavlov’s dogs, the CS was the sound of
a bell. When presented immediately prior the presentation of food on several occa-
sions, the bell would eventually trigger the salivation response by itself without the
smell of meat, thereby indicating that the dogs had learned to predict the presence
of meat from the sound of the bell. In the case of the sea slugs, one CS was a short
tactile stimulation of the siphon, which elicited a short withdrawal of the siphon.
When the CS was presented a short 0.5 sec before the UCS, and this was repeated
15 times, the CS would produce a siphon withdrawal that is more 4 times as long
as what would have resulted without the learned association between the CS and
the UCS. Just as Pavlov’s dogs appear to learn to “predict” the presence of food
from the sound of a bell, the sea slugs appear to anticipate a large electrical shock
from a short tactile stimulation of the siphon.3 Sea slugs have about 20,000 nerve
cells in its central nerve system arranged in nine ganglia [Macphail, 1993, p. 32]
compared to the approximately 1012 neurons in a human being, some of which may
have several thousand synaptic contacts [Nauta and Feirtag, 1986]. What is the
function of these extra neurons? To learn a billion more associations of the same
3No such association is learned when the CS is presented after the UCS. See [Macphail, 1993,
pp. 103-5], for a more complete description of the experiment, or the original source; Carew,
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kind? If so, how are these learned associations organized or associated together?
The most inﬂuential part of the System of Logic is Mill’s four methods of in-
duction [Mill, 1972, Book III, Chapter VIII, IX]; but these are also the butt of
many jokes. A philosopher goes to a bar on Monday and drinks whiskey and soda
water all night. The next day he drinks vodka and soda. The following night, gin
and soda, and then the night after that, bourbon and soda. Finally, on Friday,
he comes into the bar and complains that he’s been too inebriated for the past
week to get much work done, so tonight he’s going to drink whiskey without the
soda. The philosopher has used Mill’s the method of agreement to observe that
the only common thread in the four times he’s been inebriated is that he’s been
drinking soda water. Therefore, soda water causes inebriation. So much the worse
for simple inductive rules mindlessly applied.
Of Mill’s four methods, Whewell [1989, p. 286] writes: “Upon these methods,
the obvious thing to remark is, that they take for granted the very thing which is
the most diﬃcult to discover, the reduction of the phenomena to formulae such as
are here presented to us. When we have any set of complex facts oﬀered to us; for
instance...the facts of the planetary paths, of falling bodies, of refracted rays, of
cosmical motions, of chemical analysis; and when, in any of these cases, we would
discover the law of nature which governs them, or if any one chooses so to term
it, the feature in which all the cases agree, where are we to look for our A, B,C,
and a, b, c? Nature does not present to us the cases in this form...”
Whewell’s point is very simple. In order to discover a connections between two
disparate phenomena, we need to be able to extract the relevant information from
each domain, that is, introduce quantities that will prove to be connected, yet
we don’t know that until after we collect the right kind of data and see whether
the quantities ﬁt together in higher-level regularities. This kind of catch-22 makes
discovery extremely diﬃcult, though not impossible for human beings. But for
present-day machines, computer systems, and primitive organisms, it has not been
possible.
A failure to see the depth of the problem is the root cause of the overly optimistic
forecasts in the 1960s about how the AI systems would match human intelligence
within 20 years. Even the apparent exceptions to this, such as the Deep Blue chess-
playing program, prove the rule. In 1996, Deep Blue became the ﬁrst computer
system to defeat a reigning world champion (Garry Kasparov) in a match under
standard chess tournament time controls. But it did it by brute force computing
power, rather than the pattern-recognition techniques of the human chess masters,
which enable them to play 40 opponents at once. (See [Dreyfus, 1992] for an in-
depth analysis.)
In 1987, researchers based at Carnegie Mellon University (CMU) published
a book called Scientiﬁc Discovery: Computational Explorations of the Creative
Process by Langley, Simon, Bradshaw, and Zytkow. Again, the basic Whewellian
criticism was raised about the computer programs such as Bacon, an AI system
that rediscovered numeric laws such as Kepler’s third law, which equates the period
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thing to ask how to relate one variable to another when the variables are already
given, but quite another to discover Kepler’s laws from raw data about the angular
positions of the planets at various times. Even knowing that ‘position relative to
the ﬁxed stars’ and ‘time’ can be functionally related is a major step forward.
Nothing like this has been replicated by any computer system. That’s not to say
that it’s impossible (indeed Langley and Bridewell (in press) speak in terms that
remind me of Whewell). After all, our brains are computers and a network of
these computers did solve the problem. But we must recognize that the requisite
“explication of the conceptions”, to use Whewell’s term, is diﬃcult.
The most recent instance of this kind of disagreement surrounds the work by
another group at CMU headed by Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines [1993], who have
developed algorithms for discovering causal models or Bayes nets. Humphreys and
Freedman [1996] published a critique, while Spirtes, Glymour and Scheines [1997]
and Korb and Wallace [1997] published a reply. Again, this research in computer-
automated algorithms of scientiﬁc discovery is an extremely valuable. The question
is whether it could be improved by an implementation of Whewellian ideas (see
[Forster, 2006]).
In 1981, Hinton and Anderson edited an important volume on Parallel Models
of Associative Memory, which was followed up by the very famous work on parallel
distributed processing edited by Rumelhart and McClelland in 1986, which gave
birth to a thriving industry on connectionist networks, otherwise known as artiﬁ-
cial neural networks. The breakthrough was made possible by the mathematical
discovery about how to implement a learning algorithm in neural networks that
propagates backwards in the network to adjust connection weights so as to reduce
the error in the output [Rumelhart et al., 1986]. Yet again, the lesson turned out
to be the same: An all-purpose neural network is able to approximate any func-
tion in principle; but in practice too much ﬂexibility creates diﬃculties. Top-down
constraints need to be imposed on the network before data-driven search methods
can match any of the cognitive abilities of human beings. My only point is that,
in each of these episodes, it has taken quite some time to rediscover some of the
points that were raised 150 years ago in the Whewell-Mill debate.
5 IMPLICATIONS FOR PROBABILISTIC THEORIES OF EVIDENCE AND
CONFIRMATION
Allow me to predict a new example of the same thing. At the present time,
there seems to me to be an overestimation of what the methods of statistical
inference can achieve. In philosophy of science, major ﬁgures in the ﬁeld endorse
the view that Bayesian or Likelihoodist approaches to statistical reasoning can
be extended to cover scientiﬁc reasoning more generally. In [Forster, 2007], I
have argued that standard statistical methods of model selection, such as AIC
[Akaike, 1973] and BIC [Schwartz, 1978], are fundamentally limited in their ability
to replicate the methods of scientiﬁc discovery. (Note that connectionist networks
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of least squares.) In [Forster, 2006], I put forward a positive suggestion about
how Whewellian ideas about the consilience of inductions enrich the relationship
between theory and evidence, which could improve the rate of learning and the
amount that can be learned.
Continuing on the same theme, philosophers of science, such as Hesse [1968;
1971], Achinstein [1990; 1992; 1994], and more recently Myrvold [2003], have tried
to capture the conﬁrmational value of consilience and uniﬁcation in terms of stan-
dard probabilistic theories of conﬁrmation, but with limited success. The reason
for their limited success is illustrated by the following schematic example. Suppose
we have a set of three objects {a, b, c} that can be hung on a mass measuring
device, either individually or in pairs, a*b, a*c, and b*c, where a*b denotes the
object consisting of a conjoined with b, and so on. Suppose that the Data consists
of six measurements of the distances at which the counterweight need to be hung
from the center of a beam balance in order to balance the object being measured.
Let’s denote this observed distance as x(o), where o is the name of the object
being measured. In order to talk about the consilience of inductions, we need two,
or more, separate inductions; so let’s divide the data into two parts, and consider
inductions performed on each part.
Data1 = {x(a) = 1, x(b) = 2, x(c) = 3},
and
Data2 = {x(a*b) = 3, x(a*c) = 4, x(b*c) = 5}.
The core hypothesis under consideration is the assertion that for all objects o,
x(o) = m(o), where m(o) denotes a theoretically postulated property of object o
called mass.
M : (∀o)(x(o) = m(o)).
The quantity x can be repeatedly measured, but no assumption is made that its
value will be the same on diﬀerent occasions. That depends on what the world is
like. On the other hand, the hypothesis M asserts that masses are constant over
time. The postulated constancy of m, combined with the equation, predicts that
repeated measurements on the same object will be the same. It’s easy to equate
some new quantity m with the outcome of measurement x, but it’s not so easy to
defend the new quantity as representing something real underlying the observable
phenomena.
If we apply the conception that x(o) = m(o) to the two data sets, we notice
that the hypothesis accommodates the data in each case, and there is no test
of the hypothesis in the precise sense that the hypothesis would not have been
refuted had the data been “generated by” a contrary hypothesis [Mayo, 1996].
The predictive content is not tested by single measurements of each mass. Yet, weThe Debate between Whewell and Mill on the Nature of Scientiﬁc Induction 111
can arrive at an inductive conclusion from the data according to standard rules.
In the case of Data1, we arrive at the hypothesis
h1 : M&{m(a) = 1,m(b) = 2,m(c) = 3}.
Note that h1 ⇒ Data1, where ‘⇒’ means ‘logically entails’. I have no problem
with the claim that the data Data1 conﬁrms the hypothesis h1, although it does
so by pointing to the particular predictive hypothesis out of all those compatible
with M, rather than conﬁrming M itself.
Now let’s consider the inductive conclusion arrived at on the basis of Data2:
h2 M&{m(a ∗ b) = 3,m(a ∗ c) = 4,m(a ∗ c) = 5}.
Again, h2 ⇒ Data2, and the data conﬁrms the inductive hypothesis. On my
understanding of Whewell and Mill, they would agree on this.
To explain the diﬀerence between Whewell and Mill, let’s consider a stronger
inductive conclusion that includes the standard Newtonian conception that the
mass of a composite object such as a*b is the sum of the masses of the parts. We
shall call this the law of the composition of masses (LCM), and write it more
formally as:
LCM (∀o1)(∀o2)(m(o1 ∗ o2) = m(o1) + m(o2)).
Let’s denote the stronger inductive conclusions drawn from the data sets by
H1 = h1 & LCM and H2 = h2 & LCM, respectively. Again, the data conﬁrms
the respective hypotheses, but only by picking out the mass values that correctly
apply to the objects. There is no conﬁrmation of the general propositions in the
inductive hypotheses by Data1 or Data2.
But all this changes when we consider the bigger picture; for H1 and H2 entail
more than the data from which they were inductively inferred, they predict the
other data set as well. That is, H1 ⇒ Data2, and H2 ⇒ Data1. This is an
illustration of the idea behind Whewell’s consilience of inductions... “That rules
springing from remote and unconnected quarters should thus leap to the same
point, can only arise from that being the point where truth resides” [Whewell,
1989, p. 153]. The hypotheses h1 and h2 enjoy no such relationship with the data.
Another way of seeing the same thing is to note that the two data sets, Data1
and Data2, provide independent measurements of the theoretically postulated
masses, m(a), m(b), and m(c), and the independent measurements agree.4 From
Data1, we obtain values of m(a), m(b), and m(c), and from Data2, we obtain
values of m(a) + m(b) = 3, m(a) + m(c) = 4, and m(b) + m(c) = 5. Since there
are three equations in three unknowns, these equations yield an independent set
4“Independent” just means that the measurements are calculated from non-overlapping sets
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of values for the three masses, which agree with the ﬁrst set. Therefore H is con-
ﬁrmed by agreement of independent measurements of its postulated quantities,
while h = h1&h2 is not.
The intuition just described is far more forceful if we were to embellish the
example by including a set of mass measurements on a larger set of objects; say
25 objects. Then Data1 consists of 25 measurements of the 25 objects, whereas
Data2 consists of 300 measurements of all possible pairings of the 25 objects,
which provides 12 more independent measurements of each mass. That fact that
13 independent measurements of mass agree for each of 25 diﬀerent objects is very
strong evidence for the hypothesis H.
Unfortunately, we cannot obtain this conclusion (that H is better supported by
the Data than h) from the standard theories of conﬁrmation used in contemporary
philosophy of science or in statistics, such as Bayesianism and Likelihoodism.5
These views are committed to a likelihood theory of evidence that says that degree
to which a total evidence, the Data in our example, supports a hypothesis, such
as H or h, is fully exhausted by likelihoods P(Data|H) and P(Data|h). But,
H ⇒ Data, and h ⇒ Data, and, therefore, P(Data|H) = 1 = P(Data|h). The
relationship between theory and evidence is therefore the same for each of the
hypotheses according to these (well respected) accounts of the nature of evidence.
I suspect that the Bayesians and Likelihoodists will respond to this example
along the following lines. Instead of considering the hypotheses as I have deﬁned
them, which include the “determination of the magnitudes” (as Whewell would
put it), we should consider just the generalizations M and (M & LCM). Then
we can argue that (M & LCM) gives the Data a greater probability (i.e., the
hypothesis has a greater likelihood). They may argue that P(Data|M&LCM) >
P(Data|M).6 The idea behind this claim is very simple, but ﬁrst you need to
understand that (by the axioms of probability) the likelihood of a family of hy-
potheses is equal to a weighted average of the likelihoods of the hypotheses in the
family. (M & LCM) is a family of hypotheses in which one member, namely H,
has likelihood 1, while all the others have likelihood 0 because they get at least one
mass value wrong (out of the masses that have been measured). The same applies
to M; it contains one hypothesis with likelihood 1 and the rest with likelihood 0.
(Having likelihood 0 usually means that the hypothesis is refuted by the data.)
Thus, (M & LCM) has a greater likelihood because its likelihood is calculated by
5The one exception that I know of is Mayo [1996]. Her take on this example would be that
H is severely tested by the Data because the probability is high that H would be refuted if H
were false. But h is not severely tested by the Data because it would not be refuted if h were
false. The uneasiness I have with this approach is the reference to counterfactual data. Other
things being equal, I prefer a theory of conﬁrmation that focuses only on the actual data.
6Proof: P(Data|M&LCM) = P(Data1|M&LCM)P(Data2|M&LCM & Data1).
But P(Data2|M&LCM & Data1) = 1, so P(Data|M&LCM) = P(Data1|M&LCM).
But now it is clear that the hypotheses “say the same thing” about Data1, so
P(Data1|M&LCM) = P(Data1|M), and it is obvious thatP(Data1|M) > P(Data|M). Thus,
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averaging over a larger set of other hypotheses, all of which have zero likelihood.
In other words, the likelihood of M is smaller because its maximum likelihood is
washed out by averaging over a greater number of hypotheses.
The ﬁrst problem with this reply is that it changes the subject. We began
by talking about the conﬁrmation of H and h, and ended about talking about
something else. But let’s consider the conﬁrmation of (M & LCM) and M. The
problem is that under any sensible way of averaging likelihoods, it turns out to
be zero, zilch, nil. This is because there is only one point hypothesis that has
non-zero likelihood, so any weighting that averages (integrates) over an inﬁnite
number (a continuum) of point hypotheses will yield an average likelihood of zero
(Forster and Sober 1994). So, the claim that P(Data|M&LCM) > P(Data|M) is
incorrect. It should have been P(Data|M&LCM) ≥ P(Data|M). And under the
rather general conditions I have stated, P(Data|M&LCM) = P(Data|M).
The core part of the Bayesian argument, the part that was right, derives from
the inequality
P(Data2|M&LCM & Data1) = 1 > P(Data2|M & Data1) = 0.
But this inequality is just what lies at the heart of Whewell’s consilience of
inductions! Once we see that the inequality is what’s crucial, then we can express
what should be said about the original example in the language of probability,
without changing the subject. For note that the hypothesis (M & LCM) & Data1
is logically equivalent to H1, as we previously deﬁned it, and M & Data1 is
logically equivalent to h1. So the inequality is just
P(Data2|H1) = 1 > P(Data2|h1) = 0,
to which we could add
P(Data1|H2) = 1 > P(Data1|h2) = 0.
In other words, the part of the likelihood analysis that makes sense rests on
Whewellian principles. Why try to wrap it up in a Bayesian package with trap-
pings that are false at worst, and irrelevant at best? I suggest that it is philosoph-
ically more fruitful to understand the relationship between theory and evidence in
Whewellian terms right from the beginning.
To repeat, as Whewell points out, nature does not present inductive problems
in a form that lends itself to any simple methods of induction. In the mass mea-
surement example, we began with two sets of data, with two phenomena, each of
which is colligated by the formula x(o) = m(o), but we can discover no deeper
connection between them until we explicate the concept of mass by introducing
the law of composition of masses (LCM). Question: How do we explain why these
thirteen independent measurements agree? Answer: By concluding that they are
measurements of the same quantity, the eﬀects of a common cause. Arguing that
we should explain many eﬀects in terms of a common cause is the easy part of the
discovery. The harder part is to arrive at the problem in this form.
The same is true of the Kepler example.114 Malcolm Forster
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